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Abstract 
 
Low-carbon energy transitions aim to stay within a carbon budget limiting potential 
climate change to 2 ºC - or well below - through substantial growth in renewable energy 
sources alongside improved energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage. Current 
scenarios tend to overlook their low net energy returns compared to existing fossil fuel 
infrastructure. Correcting from gross to net energy, we show that a low-carbon transition 
would likely lead to a 24 to 31% decline in net energy per capita by 2050, implying a 
strong reversal of recent rising trends of 0.5% per annum. Unless vast end use efficiency 
savings can be achieved in the coming decades, current lifestyles might be impaired. To 
maintain present net energy returns, solar and wind renewable power sources should grow 
two to three times faster than in other proposals. We suggest a new indicator, ‘energy 
return on carbon’ (EROC), to assist in maximizing net energy from the remaining carbon 
budget.  
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Introduction 
 
The role of energy in maintaining or improving lifestyles tends to be strong and 
fundamental, though frequently underestimated1-4. Precise accounting of energy 
requirements is critical for accurately assessing the impact of potential transitions to a 
low-carbon economy. Following the Paris Agreement, several global energy transition 
scenarios have been presented, which tend to be analysed in terms of gross energy, and 
aimed at maintaining past rates of economic growth5,6.  However, the literature on energy 
return on investment (EROI) argues the importance of distinguishing between net and 
gross energy when making judgments about energy and lifestyles7-8. Expressed as a ratio, 
EROI signifies the amount of useful energy yielded from each unit of energy input to the 
process of obtaining that energy. The lower an energy source’s EROI, the more input 
energy is required to produce the output energy, resulting in less net energy available for 
consumption.  
 Although there is some debate around the appropriate calculation and boundaries 
of EROI9,10, it serves as a reasonable proxy for the biophysical utility of any particular 
energy source to society. It provides, at least in theory, a more objective, stable and future 
predictive assessment than information about costs and prices, as this is strongly 
influenced by erratic and short-term factors, such as subsidies, market power, strategic 
behavior of suppliers, and emotional responses by market participants. The average EROI 
of an economy’s overall energy mix can therefore provide an indication of opportunities 
for economic activity11.  
Here, we analyse low-carbon energy transitions by considering net energy per 
capita as the basis of lifestyles. By accounting for differences between gross and net 
energy, we evaluate the potential consequences of a low-carbon energy transition on 
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future lifestyles. This allows us to analyse different energy pathways in combination with 
optimistic and pessimistic estimates of EROIs in the literature.  
Our results indicate that net energy per capita is likely to decline in the future 
without substantial investments in energy efficiency. To maintain net energy per capita 
at current levels, renewable energy sources would have to grow at a rate two to three 
times that of current projections. We propose an ‘energy return on carbon’ (EROC) 
indicator to assist in maximizing potential net energy from the 2 ºC carbon budget.  
 
Illustrating the importance of EROI for lifestyles 
To illustrate the economic and welfare importance of EROI, we analyse and compare two 
hypothetical high- and low-EROI economies. As illustrated in Figure 1, both economies 
produce the same 550 EJ of gross energy. This approximates the level of current global 
production in IEA world energy balances12. The high-EROI economy has an average 
EROI equal to 20:1, which represents the present state. The low-EROI economy has an 
average EROI equal to 3:1, a level insufficient to operate societies at the current level of 
affluence in the Global North13, which might be interpreted as a hypothetical tar sand 
economy14 or a severe peak oil scenario. Both economies suffer subsequent (downstream) 
proportional losses from transformation and end use losses of 58% (based on rates of 
2011 ‘rejected energy’ in world energy flow charts15). Assuming that both societies first 
meet their requirements for essentials, such as food and water, which we are keeping 
constant at an illustrative value of 100 EJ, we calculate that the low-EROI economy would 
have less than half (54 EJ vs. 119 EJ) the net energy of the high-EROI economy available 
for consumption and production of all ‘non-essential’ goods and services. This would 
have significant implications for lifestyles, and limit the ability to invest energy for future 
economic growth.  
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Should the low-EROI society wish to match the quantity of discretionary funding  
of the high-EROI society (119 EJ), it has, theoretically, three options: increase gross 
energy production to 785 EJ {(523x3)/(3-1)}, which would be a 43% increase from 550 
EJ; improve end use energy efficiency in production and consumption of goods and 
services from 42% to 60% {(100+119)/367}; or improve the average EROI from 3 to 20 
through technological improvements and investment in higher-EROI energy sources, 
such as coal. While these ambitious goals may not be achievable in practice, some lower-
level combination of the three types of changes is likely to have compensated for the 
slowly declining global average EROI of oil and gas experienced in recent decades16. For 
example, there has been a rapid growth of coal since 2000, which has one of the highest 
EROI values of current energy options17. However, continuation of this strategy, at least 
without carbon capture and storage (CCS), is incompatible with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement18 which require the vast majority of fossil fuels to remain in the ground19. The 
most significant challenge we face may therefore not be a declining EROI of fossil fuels 
itself, but continuing to supply enough net energy while investing in a new energy system 
with relatively low net energy yields20. Moreover, population forecasts21 indicate the 
world population will be approaching 10 billion by 2050, so remaining fossil fuels will 
have to be spread among an even greater population. The challenge of a rapid transition 
to low-carbon energy is therefore twofold: staying within climate change targets while 
continuing to deliver net energy for the needs of a growing global society. 
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Figure 1 | Illustrative comparison of high and low EROI economies.  
Blue boxes illustrate flows of gross to net energy; green boxes illustrate end-use energy services; orange 
boxes illustrate energy used for reinvestment to produce more gross energy; and grey boxes illustrate 
process energy losses. The two alternatives (high and low EROI economies) are hypothetical, aimed at 
illustrating the impact of two very different EROI scenarios on lifestyles given end-use consumption on 
necessities fixed at 100EJ. The low EROI economy reinvests a far greater proportion of its gross production 
for future production than the high EROI economy. After accounting for downstream energy losses and 
consumption on necessities, this results in only around half of the net energy being delivered for non-
essential energy services. Gross energy production of 550EJ is roughly consistent with that of the global 
economy12 while energy losses are based on rates of 2011 ‘rejected energy’ in world energy flow charts15. 
 
Analytical approach 
 
Our approach to analysing future net energy returns involves four stages: defining a 
carbon budget exclusively for energy based on current literature; defining three energy 
pathway scenarios to 2050; defining ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ sets of EROI 
assumptions to capture the range of values in the current literature; and creation of an 
original, dynamic EROI model to produce net energy projections for the pathway 
scenarios, and an energy-return-on-carbon indicator. 
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Carbon energy budget 
One of the most ambitious energy transition scenarios published in response to the Paris 
Agreement is the 2017 joint report, ‘Perspectives for the Energy Transition’ by the IEA 
and IRENA5. Compared to previous IEA scenarios22, it utilizes a more stringent 
probability, >66%, of staying within 2°C warming. Defining this carbon budget precisely 
is challenging, as calculation uncertainty has resulted in a wide variety of estimates, with 
a likely range of 590–1,240 GtCO2 from 2015 onwards23.  Moreover, this budget includes 
emissions from all sources (energy and non-energy). When focusing on energy policy, 
we need to derive a carbon energy budget, which corrects for non-energy emissions. The 
most significant of these are future emissions from land use change and industrial 
processes such as cement production. The IEA/IRENA study arrives at a carbon energy 
budget of 790 GtCO2 (see Methods section for details of the calculation) and presents a 
scenario to stay within it, primarily through strong growth in renewables, improvements 
in end-use energy efficiency, and deployment of CCS for coal and natural gas. 
 
Energy pathway scenarios 
We correct gross energy to net energy for three scenarios to 2050:  LCT - a low-carbon 
transition consistent with >66% probability of limiting warming to 2 °C, using the 
IEA/IRENA scenario5 as a reference; BAU - a ‘business as usual´ scenario based on 
current trends; and CNE - an optimised transition aiming to maintain current levels of net 
energy per capita. As we use global figures, it should be noted that many countries in the 
Global South wish to grow their energy use per capita. The CNE scenario may therefore 
imply a fall in net energy consumption within the Global North. We present per capita 
results as a proxy for lifestyle implications, which is important given the context of a 
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growing global population. Details of the assumptions in each scenario are provided in 
the Methods section. 
 
EROI assumptions 
EROI values for different energy sources vary considerably from study to study. A recent 
meta-analysis17 attempted to produce mean values of EROIs for thermal and electrical 
energy sources. However, there is much debate, particularly around EROI values for 
renewable sources, due to differing perspectives on calculation methods24, and whether 
energy costs of storage and intermittency should be accounted for25-27. This has led to a 
range of EROI values for solar PV from as low as 0.8:1 (ref. 28) to over 60:1 (ref. 29). 
Respecting the various positions in this debate, we employ two sets of EROI perspectives, 
‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’, to produce an uncertainty range in our results. The latter 
perspective includes lower EROI values for biofuels and renewables and a declining 
EROI of oil and gas, in line with recent trends17. More details are provided in the Methods. 
 
Table 1 | Comparison of Mean EROIs for different energy sources 
Energy source 
Optimistic 
EROI 
Optimistic 
net energy 
percentage 
Pessimistic 
EROI 
Pessimistic 
net energy 
percentage 
Coal 
Thermal 46:1 98% 46:1 98% 
Electricity 17:1 94% 17:1 94% 
Electricity with CCS 13:1 92% 13:1 92% 
Oil 
Thermal 19:1 95% 19:1* 95% 
Electricity 7:1 85% 7:1* 85% 
Gas 
Thermal 19:1 95% 19:1* 95% 
Electricity 8:1 88% 8:1* 88% 
Electricity with CCS 7:1 86% 7:1* 86% 
Biofuels & 
waste 
Solids 
Thermal 25:1 96% 25:1 96% 
Electricity 10:1 90% 10:1 90% 
Gases & 
liquids 
Thermal 5:1 80% 3:1 67% 
Electricity 2:1 50% 1.2:1 17% 
Nuclear  14:1 93% 14:1 93% 
Hydroelectric 84:1 99% 59:1 98% 
Geothermal 9:1 89% 14:1 89% 
Wind  18:1 94% 5:1 80% 
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Solar PV  25:1 96% 4:1 78% 
Solar thermal 19:1 95% 9:1 89% 
Thermal EROI values for oil and gas are identical as the data from which they are derived is normally aggregated. 
Optimistic EROI values are taken from Hall et al.17, except for solar thermal and solar PV. Solar thermal was not 
included in the meta-analysis, so we use an estimate from Weißbach25. Optimistic values for solar PV are based on 
the median values in Leccisi et al29 which rely on more recent data. There is significant variance in the EROI between 
each particular biofuel; Hall et al.17 calculate a mean of 5, but it is skewed by several large outliers. Biofuels refers to 
all solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels from any biomass source, which has then been split into ‘solids’ and ‘gases and 
liquids’ subcategories to account for considerably higher EROIs of solid biomass (e.g. 25:1 for wood)30. Pessimistic 
EROI values for renewables are adjusted downwards in line with Weißbach25 to account for ‘buffering’ through 
energy storage. *Under pessimistic EROI assumptions, oil and gas follow a trend of -0.357 from a starting value of 
35.4 in 1971 (extrapolated from oil and gas EROI trends between 1992 and 200617).   
 
 
The relationship of EROI to net energy is non-linear, and consequently its impact 
can potentially be misjudged, particularly at very high and very low EROI values. To 
illustrate this, Table 1 also provides the ‘net energy percentage’, equal to 1 −
1
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼
 , to 
represent more clearly the amount of net energy obtained. The difference between coal 
and wind for instance – with EROIs of 46 and 18 – becomes far less pronounced 
according to this metric: 98% and 95%, respectively. The net energy percentage begins 
to reduce rapidly below EROIs of 5:1, so the significance of an EROI below this value is 
especially great. This non-linear relationship is commonly termed the ‘net energy cliff’31, 
a concept first attributed to Euan Mearns32. 
EROI figures for thermal fuels are often calculated at the mine mouth, not at the 
point of use. This makes comparisons with renewables difficult as they supply electricity 
directly, and for this reason some argue that renewables should be adjusted upwards24. 
Our approach to this problem here is to adjust the EROIs for fossil fuels that are used for 
electricity generation downwards, based upon efficiency percentages for power plants by 
the IEA12. Utilization of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology will further 
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decrease these net energy returns significantly, although very little research to date has 
looked at the effect of CCS on EROI. The IPCC special report on CCS33, however, 
suggests the capture energy requirement is 16% and 31% for natural gas and coal 
respectively, so we have produced CCS EROI estimates based on these figures. Although 
subject to some debate34,35, an additional proposal to mitigate climate change is bio-
energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) to produce net negative carbon dioxide 
emissions. The low EROI of most biofuels before trying to capture and store emissions 
presents an additional challenge, as the additional energy costs due to CCS would result 
in at best negligible, and conceivably negative, net energy to society. For this reason, 
BECCS is not considered in our analysis. 
 
Dynamic EROI model 
The relationship between EROI, gross energy and net energy for an individual energy 
source is represented by equation (1)36: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 (1 −
1
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼
)      (1) 
The total net energy delivered to society can be calculated by summing net energy 
across all energy sources, as in equation (2): 
𝐸𝑁 =  ∑ [𝑄𝑖 (1 −
1
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖
) ]𝑛𝑖=1        (2) 
Here 𝐸𝑁 = net energy delivered to society and 𝑄𝑖 = gross production of energy source i.  
However, this equation presents a static view of the net energy in society and thus fails 
to capture the dynamics during a rapidly changing energy transition. Importantly, this 
would overlook an additional challenge with converting to renewables. The growth rate 
of solar and wind renewables is limited due to the majority of energy costs being borne 
upfront in production and installation37. If the rate of growth is too fast, it would create a 
short-term net energy sink effect. To capture the resulting dynamics, we model net energy 
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supplied to society by separating EROI into operational (maintenance) and investment 
costs, captured by equation (3).  
𝐸𝑡
𝑁 =  ∑ [𝑄𝑡
𝑖 − 
𝛼𝑄𝑡
𝑖
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑖 − 
(1−𝛼)𝐿𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥{0,𝑄𝑡
𝑖−𝑄𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝑄
𝑡−𝐿𝑖
𝑖 −𝑄
𝑡−𝐿𝑖−1
𝑖 }
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑖  ]
𝑛
𝑖=1    (3) 
Here 𝐸𝑡
𝑁 = net energy delivered to society at time t, 𝑄𝑡
𝑖 = gross production of energy 
source i at time t, 𝐿𝑖 = lifetime of capital of energy source i,  α = proportion of energy 
costs attributable to operations and maintenance, and 1-α   = proportion of energy costs 
attributable to investment. Energy investment costs in each time period are calculated by 
summing the growth of an energy source in this period (𝑄𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑖 ) plus the growth at t 
– Li, which represents the investment needed to replace the capital that has now reached 
the end of its lifetime. The sum (𝑄𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑖 +  𝑄
𝑡−𝐿𝑖
𝑖 − 𝑄
𝑡−𝐿𝑖−1
𝑖 ) therefore represents total 
needed investment, which is subject to the Max{0,·} function as it is only applicable when 
investment needs are positive. The value of α is typically larger for non-renewable than 
renewable energy sources, based on data by Weißbach et al.25. See Methods for more 
details of assumptions used in the dynamic EROI model. Historical and projected net 
energy supply per capita is calculated by dividing Equation (3) by the population in each 
time period, giving Equation (4):  
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑝𝑐 =  
𝐸𝑡
𝑁
𝑃𝑡
         (4) 
Here Pt = population at time t. Per capita figures are considered in our analysis to measure 
the effect on lifestyles in the context of a growing global population. Assumptions used 
in the dynamic EROI model are summarised in Table 2, while details are provided in the 
Methods section. 
 
Table 2 | Model assumptions 
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Energy source 
Optimistic 
EROI 
assumptions 
Pessimistic 
EROI 
assumptions 
Lifetime 
(years) 
Investment 
proportion 
of energy 
costs (1-α) 
Operation & 
maintenance 
proportion of 
energy costs 
(α) 
Coal 
Thermal 46 46 45 0.086 0.914 
Electricity 17 17 45 0.086 0.914 
Electricity with CCS 9 13 45 0.086 0.914 
Oil 
Thermal 19 19* 35 0.019 0.981 
Electricity 7 7* 35 0.019 0.981 
Gas 
Thermal 19 19* 35 0.019 0.981 
Electricity 8 8* 35 0.019 0.981 
Electricity with CCS 4 7* 35 0.019 0.981 
Biofuels 
& waste 
Solids 
Thermal 25 25 40 0.003 0.997 
Electricity 10 10 40 0.003 0.997 
Gases & 
liquids 
Thermal 5 3 40 0.003 0.997 
Electricity 2 1.2 40 0.003 0.997 
Nuclear 14 14 50 0.168 0.832 
Hydroelectric 84 59 75 0.961 0.039 
Geothermal 9 9 25 0.900 0.100 
Solar PV 25 4 25 0.900 0.100 
Solar thermal 19 9 25 0.743 0.257 
Wind 18 5 20 0.977 0.023 
*Under pessimistic EROI assumptions, oil and gas follow a trend of -0.357 from a starting value of 35.4 
in 1971 (extrapolated from oil and gas EROI trends from 1992 to 200617).   
 
Model output for energy pathway scenarios 
Figure 2 illustrates the historical trend and future projections of net energy supply per 
capita under the three energy pathway scenarios. Key indicators from the model output 
are also summarized in Table 3. As we are considering the potential impact on lifestyles 
under a growing population it is pertinent to focus on per capita metrics. From 1990 to 
2014, net energy supply per capita rose at around 0.5% per annum, with particularly high 
growth seen post-2000 as a result of a boom in coal production. However, under the LCT 
scenario, there is a strong reversal of this trend, with net energy supply per capita 
declining, between 24% and 31% from 2014 levels. To maintain or improve lifestyles 
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there would therefore need to be unprecedented improvements in end use efficiency to 
reduce energy demand per capita. If efficiency improvements on this scale are 
unachievable, net energy supply per capita will decline and be insufficient to meet 
demand. Supply of net energy may then become a limiting factor to maintaining or 
improving lifestyles for a growing global population.  
The BAU scenario shows net energy per capita continuing to increase at current 
rates until 2050.  However due to continued growth in fossil fuels, the carbon budget for 
2 ºC will have already been exhausted by 2022. The CNE scenario maintains net energy 
per capita roughly constant at 2014 levels. However, this does not necessarily imply 
stagnation in lifestyles, as there is considerable potential for improvements in end use 
efficiency to facilitate this38. Note that over the period 1990 to 2000 net energy supply 
per capita was rather constant, despite global economic growth over this period. Figure 
3d compares the growth of gross solar and wind production in the LCT and CNE 
scenarios. To achieve a stable net energy supply, the rate of growth of solar and wind 
renewables would have to grow to a capacity level by 2050 that is 2.2 to- 3.0 times that 
suggested by the LCT scenario. Table 4 summarizes the change in gross energy for the 
three scenarios from 2014-2050. 
Under the LCT and BAU scenarios, we see a widening gap between gross and net 
production, while the uncertainty range for net energy also increases. The latter is not 
seen for the CNE scenario, as increased gross production compensates for the lower EROI 
values. If the pessimistic assumptions are correct, it would imply 10% less net energy 
being delivered in 2050 than if the optimistic assumptions hold. There is thus a strong 
argument for continued research into the EROI of future energy options.  
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Figure 2 | Model output. a-c, Gross and net energy production per capita for (a) LCT scenario, (b) BAU scenario, 
(c) CNE scenario. (d) Comparison of gross energy product by energy source between LCT and CNE scenarios. The 
black line in panel (d) represents the projected energy production under the LCT scenario of solar PV, solar thermal 
and wind combined. The grey area represents the comparative growth of these three energy sources in the CNE 
scenario, to keep net energy per capita roughly constant. The CNE scenario requires growth of these to be 2-3 times 
that of the LCT scenario. The shaded areas in all graphs denotes the uncertainty range between optimistic and 
pessimistic EROI assumptions. In the CNE scenario gross energy has an uncertainty range as it is endogenous here, 
whereas gross energy is exogenous in the LCT and BAU scenarios. 
 
Table 3 | Model output illustrating a tradeoff between stabilizing climate and 
continuing current lifestyles 
Scenario 
EROI 
assumptions 
Growth in 
solar and wind 
renewables by 
2050 
Average net 
energy per 
capita 2015-
2050 (GJ) 
Net energy 
percentage of 
gross energy in 
2050 
2ºC transition 
scenario (LCT) 
Optimistic  2754% 60.4 91.5% 
Pessimistic  2754% 57.3 82.9% 
Business as 
usual scenario 
(BAU) 
Optimistic  553% 75.8 93.5% 
Pessimistic  553% 73.2 85.7% 
2ºC constant 
net energy 
(CNE) 
Optimistic  6228% 68.3 92.5% 
Pessimistic  8500% 67.8 84.2% 
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Results show a tradeoff between climate and lifestyles. LCT scenario sacrifices net energy per capita while BAU 
sacrifices climate goals. CNE scenario attempts to balance both objectives, at the cost of much more rapid growth in 
solar and wind. The lower net energy percentage of the LCT and CNE scenarios indicate their less favourable energy 
mix from a net energy perspective compared to BAU. In 2014 the net energy percentage was 94.0% and 93.3% for 
optimistic and pessimistic EROI assumptions respectively. We see a considerable decline by 2050 for all scenarios 
under pessimistic EROI assumptions. 
 
Table 4 | Changes in gross energy for the three energy pathway scenarios 
Energy source 
Gross Energy 
in 2014 (EJ) 
Change in gross energy from 2014 to 2050 (EJ) 
TRA Scenario 
BAU 
Scenario 
CNE Scenario 
Coal 
Thermal 68.5 -40.1 +15.3 -40.1 
Electricity  95.2 -95.2 +70.7 -95.2 
Electricity with CCS 0.0 +24.3 +24.3 +24.3 
Oil 
Thermal 144.0 -95.8 +33.9 -95.8 
Electricity 10.9 -10.9 -0.5 -10.9 
Gas 
Thermal 70.7 -2.6 +42.3 -2.6 
Electricity 45.2 -24.7 +38.7 -24.7 
Electricity with CCS 0.0 +12.3 +12.3 +12.3 
Biofuels 
& waste 
Solids 
Thermal 48.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Electricity 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gases & 
liquids 
Thermal 4.4 +37.7 +22.4 +37.7 
Electricity 2.3 +25.7 +9.6 +25.7 
Nuclear 27.7 +56.9 -14.7 +56.9 
Hydroelectric 14.0 +16.7 +16.0 +16.7 
Geothermal 3.0 +7.8 +2.2 +7.8 
Solar PV 0.7 +29.0 +6.3 + (65.1–88.8) 
Solar thermal 1.3 +40.8 +4.4 + (92.0–125.6) 
Wind 2.6 +41.2 +11.2 + (94.5–129.4) 
Under the CNE scenario growth in solar PV, solar thermal and wind are exogenous model variables which 
are dependent on the EROI assumptions used. The model output therefore produces a range of gross energy 
for these energy sources. BAU scenario gross energy is produced by extrapolating trends based on 2005-
2014 data. 
 
 
Energy return on carbon 
 
Our analysis suggests that net energy is likely to move from an abundant to a scarce 
resource if effective measures are taken to remain within a 2°C carbon budget. As in any 
economic problem of scarcity, efforts should be made to ensure the most efficient use of 
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resources. We therefore examine the strategy of maximizing the net energy obtained from 
fossil fuels within the constraint of the carbon budget. To achieve this, we propose a 
measure of ‘energy return on carbon’ (EROC), using a metric of net energy per tCO2, 
which allows comparison of the performance of different energy sources under the 
constraint of climate change targets. EROC is calculated as [(1-1/EROI)/(Carbon 
emission factor)]. The EROC takes into account both the net energy potential of a fossil 
fuel and its carbon emissions in order to produce a metric of the fuel’s overall utility under 
climate change policy. Table 5 illustrates this indicator for the combustion of various 
fossil fuel options. It shows that tar sands and oil shale, for instance, represent inefficient 
usage of our carbon budget. 
 
Table 5 | Energy return on carbon of combusting different fossil fuels 
Energy source EROI 
Carbon emission 
factor37 
(kgCO2/TJ) 
EROC 
(EJ/GtCO2) 
Coal 46:1 94.6 10.3 
Coal with CCS 9:1 9.5 65.1 
Oil 19:1 73.3 12.9 
Oil shale 7:1 107.0 8.0 
Tar sands 4:1 107.0 7.0 
Natural gas 19:1 56.1 16.9 
Natural gas with CCS 4:1 5.6 101.9 
CCS carbon emission factors are based on capturing 85% of CO2 emissions the midpoint of 80-90% range stated in the 
IPCC special report on carbon capture and storage33. 
 
This metric supports current prioritisation of fossil fuel reductions in the order of 
coal, oil and then gas. Their net energies per GtCO2 are 10.3 EJ, 12.0 EJ and 16.9 EJ 
respectively. Gas thus provides a significant 64% more net energy per CO2 than coal, as 
the lower carbon content more than compensates for the lower EROI. The EROI of gas 
would have to fall dramatically to 2.3 for coal to become preferable to gas from a climate 
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perspective. However, even greater priority should be given to eliminating the 
exploitation of unconventional sources of oil, which have much lower EROIs than 
conventional sources17. This results in tar sands and oil shale providing only 7-8 EJ per 
GtCO2 released. It is clear that investment in such unconventional sources is not a wise 
strategy from a combined net energy and climate change perspective. While CCS shows 
promise at considerably increasing the climate efficiency of fossil fuels, more research is 
required into the full energy costs associated with this technology. 
 
Conclusions 
Economic decisions are generally made from a monetary perspective. Adding a 
biophysical perspective as we do here is relevant for assessing the gap between needs and 
the actual options of society. In particular, climate externalities are currently not reflected 
in the cost of fossil fuel energies. One way to effectively signal biophysical differences 
would be imposing a carbon price39, which would discourage coal use more than oil, and 
oil more than gas. It would thus provide appropriate incentives to realize the mentioned 
fuel prioritization in a transition.  
Regardless of the fossil fuel strategy, our analysis suggests greatly accelerated 
investment in renewable energies is needed alongside dramatic improvements in energy 
efficiency if we are to continue supplying enough net energy to match current lifestyles. 
If these changes are unable to be made, or deemed impracticable, the main conclusion to 
draw is that the 2 °C target is in itself highly unrealistic. Incidentally, the analysis may 
even underestimate the challenge and speed of the energy transition needed, due to the 
current high level of uncertainty in estimations of both carbon budgets and of non-energy 
emissions. Particular obstacles in moving away from certain fossil fuels, such as 
petroleum use in aviation, may further require renewable energy to grow even faster than 
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our projections. The net energy implications are complicated, and as discussed, much 
debate exists around EROI values. Our analysis has highlighted the importance of 
assessing the net energy return to carbon and what this means for a low-carbon energy 
transition. These implications warrant further research into net energy issues to narrow 
the debate.   
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Methods 
Carbon energy budget 
The IEA/IRENA report ‘Perspectives for the Energy Transition’5 determines a budget of 
880 GtCO2 from 2015 as a starting point, which falls in the middle of the range of 590–
1,240 GtCO2 from 2015 onwards
23. From this starting budget, it deducts 90 GtCO2 for 
industrial process up until 2100. Although other studies suggest that future emissions for 
land use, land use change and forestry could mean a further reduction of 138 GtCO2
40, 
the IEA/IRENA scenario assume these to net zero over the century due to massive 
reforestation efforts. Despite this arguably optimistic assumption, we have chosen to use 
the same carbon energy budget as in the IEA/IRENA scenario of 790 GtCO2 in our 
analysis, to allow comparability. 
 
Energy pathway scenarios 
Three scenarios of energy pathways until 2050 are considered. In the low-carbon 
transition (LCT) scenario, gross energy projections for all energy sources approximate 
values in 2017 IEA/IRENA report ‘Perspectives for the Energy Transition’7. In the 
business as usual (BAU) scenario, gross energy projections for all energy sources are 
calculated by extrapolating trends in the ten-year period 2005-2014 from IEA ‘World 
Energy Balances’ energy production data12. Finally, the constant net energy (CNE) 
scenario aims at calculating the minimum rate of growth in solar and wind required to 
maintain net energy per capita at 2014 levels.  
Our interest in the CNE scenario is to measure how much extra investment in 
renewables, above that seen in the LCT scenario, would be needed to maintain net energy 
per capita at 2014 levels. Hydroelectric, geothermal, nuclear and biofuels all have limits 
to their potential for expansion which will make significant growth beyond that already 
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projected in the 2 ºC scenario difficult41. There is a limited quantity of appropriate dam 
sites and potential geothermal locations, while biofuels suffer from land use competition, 
which will become an even greater challenge as food production adapts to population 
growth42. Nuclear energy also has technical and resource requirements that are likely to 
constrain its growth beyond currents plans. In the CNE scenario, we therefore treat growth 
in hydroelectric, biofuels, geothermal, and nuclear power to 2050 as exogenous, based on 
the LCT scenario, while solar and wind growth rates are endogenous to compensate for 
any shortages in net energy supply. Growth in solar and wind is unlikely to be constrained 
by technical limits, as the technology is already mature enough to be implemented quickly 
and on a large scale. Wind power, for instance, has an estimated potential of up to 600 
EJ41, which is greater than current global energy production from all sources. We thus 
treat solar and wind as the low-carbon options for any additional growth in energy supply 
beyond the LCT scenario. Hence, gross production of coal, oil, gas, biofuels and waste, 
nuclear, hydroelectric and geothermal are identical for the CNE and LCT scenarios. For 
the CNE scenario, solar and wind renewables are calculated by minimising their growth 
rate subject to net energy per capita from 2015-2050 equalling 36 (the number of years 
from 2014 to 2050) times 2014 values. This optimization problem is solved employing a 
generalized reduced gradient algorithm.  
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Historic gross energy production for the period 1990-2014 is obtained from IEA world 
energy balances12, and re-categorized into the ten energy categories seen in Table 2; coal, 
oil, gas, biofuels and waste, nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal and solar PV, solar 
thermal and wind. ‘Peat and peat products’ and ‘heat’ with shares of 0.03% and 0.016%, 
respectively, of 2013 total energy production are discounted from the analysis due to their 
insignificant values.  
 
EROI assumptions 
 
EROI assumptions are summarised in Table 4 along with lifetime and α assumptions. The 
‘biofuels and waste’ category is split into two subcategories; ‘solids’ and ‘liquids and 
gases. This is to reflect the much higher EROI estimates of solid biomass such as wood30 
compared to modern liquid biofuels17. Coal, oil, natural gas, and biofuels and waste 
categories are split into ‘thermal’ and ‘electricity’ subcategories. EROI values for 
electricity production are calculated by applying power plant efficiency factors from IEA 
world energy balances12, which are 37%, 35%, 44% and 40%, respectively. There is little 
research on the EROI of fossil fuels with CCS technology to date. The contribution of 
CCS to EROIs is therefore approximated by using the capture energy requirement in the 
IPCC special report on CCS33 – 16% for natural gas (NGCC plant) and 31% for coal (PC 
plant), which are cumulative to the electricity efficiency losses. However, as it is not clear 
if these percentages represent a complete depiction of the all CCS energy costs, there may 
be an underestimation of the CCS net energy impact in our results. 
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Dynamic EROI model  
We generate scenarios for future energy pathways to stay within a 2°C carbon energy 
budget, while correcting for net vs gross energy delivered to society. Net energy is 
converted to per capita values to capture the effect of an increasing global population over 
the time period. Calculations were made using United Nations population data21, gross 
energy from IEA energy production data12. The resulting model was run for three energy 
forecast scenarios (TRA, BAU and CNE), each with the two sets of ‘optimistic’ and 
‘pessimistic’ EROI assumptions, thus producing six model outputs in total. Historical 
IEA energy production data from the ‘World Energy Balances’ for 1971-201412 were 
used. 
Proportions of investment and operational energy are based on data by Weißbach 
et al. (2013)25. Although the methodology for calculating EROIs has been critised26,27, 
this criticism did not pertain to these assumptions. Lifetime assumptions are calculated 
by taking the mean of the three data sets offered in Table 11 in Tidball et al.43, except for 
hydroelectric, as average values were not mentioned in this study. We therefore use a 
lifetime value of 75 years for hydroelectric, which is consistent with the IEA’s range44 of 
50-100. 
One factor not explicitly considered in the model is the early retirement of fossil 
fuel capital, which would potentially lower the net energy returns. However, as 
operational and maintenance costs are the vast majority of fossil fuel energy investment, 
this would not be one of the key drivers of the results. 
 
Data availability 
 
The historic energy production data analysed during the current study are available in the 
OECDiLibrary repository, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/25186442 [12] and also at 
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http://www.iea.org/statistics/. Projected energy production data are available from the 
corresponding author upon reasonable request. Population forecast data are available 
from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ [21].   
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